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Introduction 
Anyone who has attempted to read the Phenomenology of Perception remembers 
the initial opacity of the text. One wonders what the author is actually getting at. 
What is being attempted here? Where is the argument exactly? Reading the text, 
one initially gets the sense that Merleau-Ponty is distracted, constantly shifting 
between problems and examples. With others texts, it is often possible to 
reassure oneself that one understands what has been said so far by correctly 
anticipating where the text will lead. This is practically impossible in the 
Phenomenology. Yet this very opacity is its great strength, for it invites (incites, 
even!) the reader to lend themselves to the text, to inhabit its rhythms and make 
them their own. The Phenomenology is not written in the form of an inference, or a 
novel. It would probably be appropriate to say that it is not written, but painted. 
Each sentence is a little patch of colour, which is why we get the sense that the 
meaning of the text is not in these sentences but between them. Perhaps we should 
not be surprised, then, that our experience of reading the Phenomenology 
resembles Merleau-Ponty's experience of viewing a painting. 
I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am 
looking at. For I do not look at it as I do at a thing: I do not 
fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of 
Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or 
with it, than that I see it. (PriP, 164) 
So, one does not read the Phenomenology, one reads with it, or according to it; 
following its meandering trajectory until around the next turn one finds something 
that is, if not expected, then at least familiar. The Phenomenology is basically 
understood when one incorporates its style. At that point, one may not be able to 
say authoritatively what the text is about, or how it works, but one will be able 
to respond to situations or assertions in a similar vein. Overcoming the opacity of 
the Phenomenology is not like acquiring knowledge, it is more like acquiring a 
habit. One finds oneself involved in a new way of dealing with things. 
However, if the most difficult thing about reading the Phenomenology is becoming 
accustomed to its elliptical style and overcoming its opacity, the most dangerous 
thing about reading that work is that, at the same time, it is easy to lose touch 
with that opacity altogether. Having accommodated ourselves to it, and acquired 
the requisite skill, the text itself can disappear almost entirely, leaving nothing 
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but a prompt for us to re-adopt that posture or exercise that skill. The painting 
can become nothing but its title or content.  
So the real challenge is to preserve its visibility; to keep its horizons open; to keep 
it fresh. This is not done by simply keeping it on show and in view, that is, 
stressing its importance and value. A classic remains a classic not by being 
lauded, but by being controversial and difficult; and a classic does not generate 
simply a diversity of opinion, but a range of paradigms within which opinions 
are evaluated. Preserving the visibility, the generativity, of the Phenomenology 
therefore requires demonstrating that it is still capable of disclosure, by which I 
mean that it is still open to being disclosed. 
In its broadest terms, the aim of this thesis is to contribute to keeping the reading 
of the Phenomenology open. In particular, I want to show that a relatively minor 
deformation of the way it is read for cognitive science – a reading that I think is 
far more influential, especially in analytic circles, than its published output 
reflects – can reveal quite a different Phenomenology. I hope to show that, in much 
the way a focus on different patches of colour can re-animate and shift the 
meaning of a painting, so a focus on the phenomenon of transcendence and 
pathological rather than normal embodiment can re-animate and shift the 
meaning of the Phenomenology of Perception, and give it a fresh relevance for 
contemporary thought.  
* 
Since Hubert Dreyfus' stinging attack on the theoretical and phenomenological 
presuppositions that sustain the optimism toward what is now referred to as 
"good, old-fashioned artificial intelligence" in What Computers Can't Do (1979), 
Merleau-Ponty's name has been associated with the orientation of post-
cognitivist developments in cognitive science. Cognitive science aspires to be a 
science of mind in the strict sense of the word. That is, it harbours the conviction 
that mental phenomena are amenable to experimental inquiry and quantitative 
analysis, and hopes to explain cognitive function in non-mental terms. Post-
cognitivist varieties of cognitive science attempt to preserve this ambition and 
(broadly speaking at least) this methodological conviction, while dispensing with 
the cognitivist assumption that mental function consists in the rule-governed 
manipulation of discrete symbols. In the late twentieth century, many post-
cognitivist approaches to cognition have emerged, not necessarily in competition 
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with each other, including embodied cognition, situated cognition, enactive 
cognition and dynamical systems theory (DST). 
In Dreyfus' influential book, Merleau-Ponty shares the role of providing an 
alternative paradigm for thinking about cognition with Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, but it may be argued that Merleau-Ponty's importance to the 
development of post-cognitivism has outstripped the other two. Certainly, it was 
Merleau-Ponty to whom the authors of the Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch 1991) turned when they sought to inaugurate the enactivist strand of 
cognitive science.  
That interest has persisted over the last fifteen years – through contributions 
from Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, Sean Kelly, Ron McClamrock 
and Ralph Ellis among others1. In that time, a literature has developed to such an 
extent that is becoming appropriate to ask questions about both the specificity 
and the diversity of views on the relevance of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive 
science.  
This diversity of views within the literature can be exemplified by pointing to the 
tensions between the reception of Merleau-Ponty by pro-connectionist and pro-
enactivist readers. Take for example Dreyfus' scathing review of the Embodied 
Mind (Dreyfus 1993). In his review, Dreyfus challenges the authors' 
characterisation of Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on embodiment as requiring that 
we see our bodies as both physical and experiential structures, as both inner and 
outer, arguing that Merleau-Ponty held instead that the body forms a third genus 
of being between pure subject and object (Cf. PhP 350). Dreyfus also criticizes 
them for offering the passive, detached attitude of mindfulness meditation in 
place of phenomenology, suggesting that this is based on the mistaken 
assumption that Merleau-Ponty wants to characterise subjective experience. 
Since, in Dreyfus' opinion, Merleau-Ponty in fact objects to the "passive, 
detached attitude" of theory, which "distorts our sense of our active, involved 
body", it is ironic that the authors' offer a similar passive, detached attitude in its 
place.  
The criticism was returned in a rather oblique way in the introduction to the 
Naturalizing Phenomenology anthology (Petitot et al. 1999), which Varela co-
authored. There the editors attack Dreyfus' interpretation of Husserl. They argue 
                                                
1 See the bibliography for references.  
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that Dreyfus is wrong to interpret Husserl's phenomenology as a variety of 
cognitivism and the Husserlian intentional state as "a sort of mental linguistic 
symbol" (59). More importantly from the perspective of our interest in Merleau-
Ponty, they write that "This symbolic aspect of [Dreyfus'] interpretation plays a 
major role in his rejection of Husserl's phenomenology in favor of the work of 
Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger." (ibid.) As a result, a new dimension of 
complexity has been added to the topic of Merleau-Ponty's significance for 
cognitive science. Merleau-Ponty's relationship to Husserl is now implicated. 
This illustrates the way the task of determining Merleau-Ponty's relevance for 
cognitive science has begun to take the form of developing a reading of Merleau-
Ponty. It has become possible, and I believe timely, to begin inquiring into the 
diversity and specificity of these readings of Merleau-Ponty for cognitive science, 
and this is the first specific task to which this thesis is set. 
In the first chapter, I address separately the psychological and philosophical 
aspects of Merleau-Ponty's reception. Considered from the perspective of 
determining Merleau-Ponty's relevance to cognitive science, this might appear to 
be an arbitrary separation. However, when understanding the reading of 
Merleau-Ponty at work, it is important to distinguish between an affinity of 
descriptions and an appropriation of arguments. The psychological aspect of the 
reading is generally concerned with pointing to similarities between the way in 
which connectionists or enactivists summarize their approach to cognition and 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological descriptions of embodied perception. By 
contrast, the philosophical aspect is an appropriation of critical moves against 
contemporary varieties of objectivism. Contemporary theories which are labeled 
as objectivist often play a foundational role in cognitivist cognitive science, 
making these philosophical arguments relevant in the cognitive science context.  
The philosophical aspect of the reading has had a fortunate side-effect. Merleau-
Ponty's reception has provided a source of optimism for those of us who are keen 
to see an end to the division of contemporary philosophy into analytic and 
continental schools. By provoking an engagement between Merleau-Ponty and the 
foundations of cognitive science, this reception has enabled a further engagement 
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with prominent analytic philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett, Christopher 
Peacocke, Gareth Evans and John McDowell2.  
However, it is the optimism concerning a convergence of cognitive science with 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology (and phenomenology more generally) that really 
interests me here. In the preamble, I contribute to it myself by illustrating the 
suggestive similarities between parts of the Phenomenology and Ballard's 
"animate" model of computer vision. The question is what to do with this 
optimism – can it have a theoretical grounding or find a systematic expression? 
There has been a range of attempts to formalise the relationship between 
phenomenology and cognitive science, and in the third section, I consider four of 
these. They divide roughly into two groups: Dreyfus and McClamrock regard 
phenomenology as a propaedeutic to scientific inquiry that is therefore 
undertaken prior to the procedures of cognitive science, providing its explicanda 
or taxonomy. Meanwhile, Varela and Gallagher regard phenomenology and 
cognitive science as complementary procedures, which are to be coordinated 
synchronically. 
What these attempts at formalising the relationship share is an implicit faith in 
the compatibility of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions with naturalistic explanations. 
However, what is really striking about the way Merleau-Ponty is read in this 
literature is that this compatibility seems to come for free. That is, unlike the 
reading of Husserl, no attempt is made to naturalize Merleau-Ponty.  
* 
At one level, the reason for this is simply that, unlike Husserl, Merleau-Ponty is 
not construed as a transcendental philosopher. However, such a reading still 
needs to account for Merleau-Ponty's ongoing interest in transcendental 
philosophical concerns – for example, his acknowledgement of a need to reveal 
the transcendental significance of the phenomenal field. This account takes place 
off-stage, and finds support from commentators and critics of Merleau-Ponty 
within the mainstream analytic and phenomenological traditions. These enabling 
interepretations allow Merleau-Ponty's relationship with transcendental 
philosophy to be downplayed in the context of his relevance for cognitive science, 
because they overwhelmingly suggest that Merleau-Ponty is inadequately 
                                                
2 See e.g. the response to Dennett (1991) in Thompson (1999); and Kelly (1998; and 2001) on Merleau-
Ponty's relationship to Peacocke, Evans and McDowell. 
Introduction 
 6
committed to a transcendental perspective, or that his commitment is either 
unjustified or philosophically unintelligible. I consider these interpretations at the 
start of chapter two. 
I also argue that there is support within some of the more recent literature that 
could make room for a reconsideration of the transcendental aspects of Merleau-
Ponty's philosophy. For example, Merleau-Ponty qualifies his own description of 
embodied perception in light of the problem of transcendence, which is also the 
central concern of transcendental phenomenology. This raises the question of 
whether one can legitimately appropriate Merleau-Ponty's description while 
ignoring altogether the question of how he deals with the phenomenon of 
transcendence, since it is arguably only in the context of a transcendental 
standpoint that this description makes sense. 
Two further considerations set the stage for re-evaluating the sense in which 
Merleau-Ponty adopts a transcendental standpoint. The first is Sebastian 
Gardner's suggestion that Merleau-Ponty presupposes the possibility of a 
transcendental standpoint in order to critically engage with the transcendental 
tradition from within, without offering any criticism of realism. This diffuses the 
issue of the perceived inadequacy of such a criticism. But if Merleau-Ponty 
doesn't offer an argument for adopting a transcendental standpoint, it might 
nonetheless be true that he still answers the core demand (pointed out by 
Pietersma) of providing a motive for adopting it. With these considerations in 
mind, I turn to the task of re-evaluating Merleau-Ponty's relationship to the 
transcendental tradition.  
In the second half of chapter two, then, I argue that the traditional view of 
transcendental philosophy as attempting to refute or negate scepticism is 
implicitly revised by Merleau-Ponty. The emphasis is rather on (dogmatic) 
philosophy's failure to take the sceptic seriously enough. Moreover, I argue that 
the pathological subject plays the role of the sceptic in the Phenomenology of 
Perception. This allows me to reread Merleau-Ponty's critique of intellectualism 
and empiricism as an objection to their failing to take such pathological subjects 
seriously, and ultimately rendering them invisible or unintelligible. In attempting 
to do justice to the phenomenon of pathology, Merleau-Ponty exposes the 
dogmatic objectivism that animates both. 
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The most important aspect of this is probably the significance that it has for how 
we understand Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological method, and its relationship 
to intersubjectivity. Merleau-Ponty has often been portrayed as placing a limit on 
the Husserlian reductions, and in particular, on rejecting what is called the 
transcendental reduction. This view treats Merleau-Ponty's existentialism as 
being at odds with Husserl's intellectualism or idealism, and is based largely on a 
comparison of the Phenomenology of Perception with Ideas I, with its famous and 
unfortunate claim (in §49) that transcendental subjectivity is an absolute 
consciousness, which would survive even the nihilation of the world. Naturalists 
and materialists find such a claim unintelligible, while others conclude that 
Husserl was proposing a resurrection of Cartesianism. Merleau-Ponty's portrayal 
of himself as carrying on Husserl's phenomenological project has been regarded 
by commentators as an overly generous reading, either of Husserl, or of himself, 
depending upon their point of view.  
On the other hand, mainstream Merleau-Ponty scholarship is itself undergoing a 
seismic shift in the wake of the publication of significant portions of Husserl's 
Nachlaß. Having the opportunity to consult the previously "two-thirds 
unpublished" Husserl which Merleau-Ponty read in Leuven, to read it with him, 
has already forced the community to begin the task of re-evaluating the 
relationship between these two great phenomenologists. I turn to Françoise 
Dastur's influential paper on intersubjectivity and Husserl's phenomenological 
reduction to demonstrate that, read in the manner that I have suggested, Merleau-
Ponty can be seen as attempting a kind of intersubjective reduction that remains 
very close to a mature view of Husserl. 
This reading helps make sense of Merleau-Ponty's notorious claim, in the Preface 
to the Phenomenology, that "the most important lesson which the reduction 
teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction." (PhP, xiv) There have 
been many conflicting interpretations of this claim, but until recently all of them 
have shared the view that this claim should be interpreted as a criticism of 
Husserl, and have sought to explicate this purported incompletability in terms of 
the rejection of some aspect of Husserl's phenomenological method. 
* 
In the final chapter I take up two challenges raised in chapter two: 1) to illustrate 
the significance that Merleau-Ponty's concern with transcendence has for his 
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description of the body's role in perception, and 2) to show how using a 
confrontation with pathology as the motive for adopting a transcendental 
standpoint remains relevant in a contemporary setting.  
John Haugeland offers an account of the body's role in "objective perception" that 
aims to be sensitive to the phenomenon of transcendence while remaining 
compatible with "naturalism, broadly construed". On the one hand, Haugeland 
takes a broadly Kantian line in his account, which treats the conditions for there 
being objects of perception as identical to the conditions for the perception of 
objects. On the other hand, he construes the conditions for the perception of 
objects in terms of the coordination of two sets of perceptual skills into a stance.  
Haugeland argues that the transcendence of the objects of perception is not a 
kind of inaccessibility or alienness, but rather a kind of independence, in the 
sense that the phenomena themselves can make the perception of them untenable. 
In this way, the objectivity of perception is tied to its vulnerability to collapse in 
the face of "recalcitrant incompatibilites". What is meant by vulnerability here is 
not merely likelihood or probability of collapse, and this vulnerability would be 
meaningless for the perceiver if it were not for a personal commitment on their 
part to preserve the stance. Haugeland therefore introduces the notion of an 
existential commitment, which is his way of resurrecting the importance of the 
first-personal stake or involvement in the intelligibility of what is perceived. 
A key point of tension between Haugeland and Merleau-Ponty lies in their 
differing accounts of the basis for the unity and diversity of sensibility. I argue 
that Merleau-Ponty would disagree with Haugeland in presupposing that 
sensibility can be analyzed into a collection of discrete mundane skills. For 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, synaesthesia is the rule, which means that these 
skills are not arbitrarily related prior to their coordination by some overarching 
collection of constitutive skills, as Haugeland suggests. This leads me to the 
provisional conclusion that Haugeland describes a founded mode of perception, 
more akin to categorial intuition than perception itself.  
Now, it might be objected that this criticism is merely the acknowledgement of a 
difference in topic, and so I am obliged to show how Haugeland presupposes a 
founding mode of perception, beneath the objective perception he describes. I do 
this in two ways: first through an immanent critique, inspired by a critical remark 
made by Robert Cummins, and secondly, through a reenactment of the kind of 
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confrontation with pathology which we attributed to Merleau-Ponty in the 
previous chapter. 
I argue that the vulnerability that grants the stance its objectivity compromises 
the possibility of correcting that stance in the wake of discovering that it is 
objectively incorrect. There can be no partial revision of a stance, every revision is 
a revolution, because the coordination of mundane skills is entirely due to the 
stance in which they participate. When that stance is undermined, when the 
phenomena actually assert their "independence", one is, as it were, thrown back 
to square one. Thus, my first critique is that Haugeland's account of the objective 
correctness of perception precludes an account of its objective correction. 
Haugeland's account of the role of an empty excluded zone in the constitution of 
a stance is comparable to the role of abjection in the constitution of the body 
image. In this second critique of Haugeland, I call on Gail Weiss' account of 
anorexia. Weiss argues that we cannot understand anorexia in terms of a 
difference between the body one has and the body one is supposed to have, 
because this difference applies to all of us. Instead, she argues that the person 
suffering from anorexia is over-committed to a particular body image, and has 
lost a certain corporeal fluidity which would allow the substitution of another 
image in its place. Confronting Haugeland's account with the phenomenon of 
anorexia, I challenge him to differentiate an existential commitment to a stance 
from this pathological, and self-pathologising, over-commitment to a particular 
body image. The fact that Haugeland cannot differentiate them is suggested by 
the kinds of examples he uses, which treat the suspicion that one is suffering 
from some sort of pathology (usually madness or deception) as part of the 
normal perception of things. 
Merleau-Ponty's account does not suffer from the same problems as Haugeland's 
because transcendence is not construed in terms of independence, but in terms of 
the fecundity and inexhaustibility of the sensible. So, instead of compensating for 
vulnerability through enforcing a personal commitment, we have the pre-personal 
development of a style within an inexhaustible field. I argue that, if we wish to 
account for the replacement of one perception by another that corrects it, it is 
crucial to distinguish the kind of projected background of a cognitive act 
described by Haugeland from what Merleau-Ponty describes as the world-
horizon. The latter is a transcendental concept which cannot be naturalised as 
the correlate of an arrangement of skills.  
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Moreover, this world-horizon is essentially intersubjective. Returning to a 
discussion of the hidden sides of things from a Husserlian perspective, I argue 
that there is a reference to intersubjectivity in the experience of transcendent 
things. This is not a reference to the actual concrete experience of others. The 
intersubjectivity in question is an unbounded co-perceptibility. I show that 
Merleau-Ponty is aware of this in the Phenomenology and that this helps to 
explain the way he describes the concrete experience of others. 
The living body is not analysable into discrete skills, which are meaningless in the 
absence of a coordinating commitment, rather the senses are so many ways of 
expressing one's inherence in a situation. On the verge of such an expression, we 
experience the fecundity of that situation in the form of an invitation, and it is 
through this metaphor of invitation that we can come to understand Merleau-
Ponty's notion of a pre-personal commitment. This is a passive, anonymous 
commitment which one finds oneself to bear, and which ultimately founds the 
personal, existential commitment Haugeland describes. 
